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The study presents the proposal for a framework of a bow-tie based quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) on a system of an offshore oil and gas platform. Offshore operations 
such as drilling or production are associated with a high level of risk because they 
typically operate in a dynamic and tough environment, especially at the deep-water 
region. The necessity of having an integrated methodology or a framework of risk 
analysis will provide a supportive infrastructure for engineers in making decisions for 
the purposes of risk mitigation and risk prevention during the new or operating 
installations.  
The subject of the study is to create a generic framework of quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) which is based on bow-tie method. The paper will start by 
proposing on how the bow-tie based QRA will be done. Then, the paper will continue 
by defining a system of an offshore oil and gas platform to be studied in the ‘System 
Definition’ phase in which a case study using the proposed QRA will follow.  
The framework will start by defining the system and a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) will 
be developed based on the simplified Process Flow Diagram (PFD). From the top event 
of the Fault Tree Analysis, the top event will be used as the Initiating Event for the 
development of Event Tree Analysis (ETA) which is proposed by the bow-tie method. 
The consequences of the failure will be presented in the ETA.  
In order to complete the risk equation, the probability of occurrence from the ETA will 
be multiplied with its Impact or Consequences using Risk Matrix Analysis that is 
proposed in ISO 17776 to rank the risks according to their risk levels.  
The result of this QRA will be that when the highest risk of the systems has been 
identified, it will be useful for the process or mechanical piping engineer to provide 
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Risk assessment is a technique for identifying, quantifying and evaluating hazards. It 
is widely used in the oil and gas industries to support risk mitigation, prevention and 
maintenance. Apart from that, oil and gas industries are constantly exposed to high 
risk levels due to the dynamic and rough working environment. Quantitative risk 
assessment includes estimating the likelihood (frequencies) and consequences of 
hazard occurrence. After the risk has been quantified, appropriate risk-management 
options can be planned and devised.  
 
1.1. Background of Study 
 
1.1.1. The History of Risk Assessment on Offshore Installations 
Oil and gas industries are the major source of world’s source of energy. Throughout 
the years of exploration and production development, new technological advancement 
has pushed all oil custodians in the whole world towards the limit of exploring new 
fields such as deep-water. In 1970s, when offshore drilling and production platform 
was complemented with living quarters, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) 
issued regulations in demanding risk evaluation to be performed. It was the first 
regulatory requirement for proper Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA), as it is known 
today.  
Before the incident of Piper Alpha in July 1988, there was no regulatory practice was 
in place especially for risk assessment [1]. The Piper Alpha accident in 1988 provided 
a tragic validation that major accidents can be predicted and prevented using risk 
analyses and QRA specifically could be useful to reduce the risk [2]. 
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Figure 1: Piper Alpha on fire (taken from: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/real-life-
stories/piper-alpha-25-years-on-2031040) 
Right after the incident, the observation regarding the risk analysis is that, risk analysis 
activities were performed rapidly for new installations by 1992, which was due to the 
newly made regulations by Health and Safety Executive (HSE). 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Despite having positive technological development in the oil and gas industries, a 
rising awareness has stimulated oil custodians to consider various types of risk analysis 
in order to prevent or to mitigate the possible hazards due to the high-risk activities in 
the oil and gas industries especially involving offshore operations and activities.  
Due to the availability of various tools for risk assessments, the hypothesis that can be 
made is that there is no unifying framework which combines these risk assessment 
tools together to perform a risk assessment study. By combining several risk 
assessment tools together, it is expected to benefit from the advantages of those 




The research focuses on THREE (3) main objectives, which are: 
1. To apply the generic framework of the proposed bow-tie based Quantitative 
Risk Assessment (QRA) on a particular engineering operation involving 
offshore oil and gas operation. 
2. To develop a fault and event tree analysis in order to calculate the probability 
of the top event.  
3. To develop a bow-tie model for risk assessment purposes. 
1.4. Scope of Study 
The scope of study outlines the boundary and the limits of the study. 
The scope of study will commence from the beginning of the typical QRA which is 
from defining the system under study. Then it will go through the cycle of the proposed 
methodology of bow-tie based QRA within the limit of conceptual design or simplified 
design of a system, not a detailed one. The study would only like to prove that a generic 
theoretical methodology can be carried out.  The scope of work is divided into three 
very essential stages;  
The first stage will involve the system definition and literature review regarding the 
bow-tie based Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) particularly on the offshore oil 
and gas installations. The system definition is very essential in this study because it is 
the foundation for the subsequent analyses.  
The second stage of this study will involve the application of Fault Tree Analysis and 
Event Tree Analysis. These analyses will be performed based on the system that has 
been identified during the earlier stage of this study. The failure data and hazards 
identified during the first stage will also be useful for the analyses.  
The last stage of the study is to complete the equation of risk by multiplying the 
probability of occurrence with the impact of the consequences found after completing 











2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction to Risk Assessment 
Oil and gas exploration and production activities have many hazards associated with 
them. 
Different tools and techniques can be used to identify and assess hazards and risk, and 
it is important that the appropriate approach is selected.  
Physical situations that possess potential to cause danger or harm are known hazard. 
Therefore, an oil tanker is a hazard because it has the potential to start a fire. 
Exploration drilling or wildcat drilling activities are exposed to hazards because these 
activities have the potential to cause blowouts [3]. 
Accidents are the realisation of a hazard [3]. 
Risk is the combination of the likelihood and consequence of such accidents. It is 
further defined as the probability of adverse event. The likelihood can be expressed 
either as frequency which is the rate of events per unit time or a probability. The 
consequence is the degree of harm or impact caused by the event [3] [4]. 
Risk assessment is a process through which the frequency of a hazardous event and 
impact of the consequence is measured or calculated.  Risk assessment measures the 
intensity of a hazard to a system [4] [5].The intensity is measured in the perspective of 
the severity or the magnitude of the outcomes of the hazards and usually, it is measured 
in terms of the possible loss of life or injury that personnel are exposed to. Risk 
assessment consists of two distinct stages which are qualitatively identify and 
characterize the hazard and the later stage is to quantify the risk [5]. 
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For new installations or activities in oil and gas exploration and production, it is 
essential to identify hazards as early as possible in order to provide engineers enough 
time to organize a study and evaluation of the hazard before any installations are made 
or activities are carried out [6].  
2.2. Quantitative vs. Qualitative Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is defined as a function of the probability and consequence of an 
accident or potential hazard. Risk assessment maybe be performed or implemented on 
a qualitative or quantitative basis.  
The qualitative method assesses risk by using an index system which is based on the 
basic data of a system such as pipeline lengths, flow rate etc. The basic data will be 
assessed by experienced professionals, producing a qualitative set of judgement of 
possible constituted risks [7] 
The quantitative method assesses risk by numerical simulation, including a 
quantitative calculation of possibilities and consequences of different accidents. 
Typically, the outcomes of quantitative method are individual risk and social risk [7]. 
Qualitative approach can be adequate for risk assessments of a simple system or a 
simple facility or operation. However, the application of quantitative methods is 
considered when [7]; 
 Several risk reduction options are available in which relative effectiveness is 
not apparent 
 The exposure of risk to the workforce, public, environment or asset is assumed 
to be high 
 The equipment spacing allows significant risk of escalation 
 New technology is involved resulting in a perceived high level of risk which 
no historical data is available 
 Demonstration of relative risk levels and their risk levels and their causes to 
the workforce is needed to make them more conscious of the risk 
 Demonstration within the operation unit and to third parties, including the 
regulating authorities, that risk are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) 




Figure 2: Quantitative versus qualitative assessment [8] 
Quantitative assessment estimates practical values for consequences and their 
probabilities and produces values of the level of risk in specific units defined. Full 
quantitative assessment may not always be possible due to lack of historical data [8]. 
2.3. Purpose of Quantitative Risk Assessment 
The purposes of a QRA may include [3]: 
 Estimating risk levels and assessing their significance in order to decide 
whether the risks need to be reduced 
 Identifying the main contributors to the risk in order to comprehend the nature 
of the hazards and to suggest risk reduction measures 
 Defining design accident scenarios to be used as design basis for installations 
 Comparing design options 
 Evaluating risk reduction measures 
 Demonstrating acceptability to regulators to show whether risks have been 
made as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) 
 Identifying safety-critical procedures and equipment to minimise risk during 
operation 
 Identifying accident precursors which may be monitored during operation to 
provide warning of adverse trends in accidents. 
Quantitative risk assessment has been proven in providing engineers to monitor risks 
and to provide guidance in decision-making about safety issues especially in oil and 

















2.4. Components of Quantitative Risk Assessment 
2.4.1. System Definition 
The first stage of QRA is system definition whereby the installation or the activity of 
whose risks to be analysed is defined.  
This stage determines the scope of work for the QRA and it defines the boundaries for 
the study in which it identifies the activities that are included and which are excluded 
[3]. 
2.4.2. Hazard Identification 
The second component of QRA is to identify the initiators or basic events of accidental 
sequences.  
Hazard identification consists of a qualitative review of accidents that may occur, 
based on previous accident experience. In QRA, hazard identification is a technique to 
select a list of possible failure cases that are suitable for quantitative modelling [3]. 
Hazard identification is the most essential part of QRA because if the hazards have not 
been identified, the hazards cannot be mitigated [2]. 
The process of hazard identification includes identifying hazards by cause, location, 
consequence or impact grouping. The objective is to specify failure cases or starting 
conditions for accidents to be modelled.  
There are several techniques to identify hazards [2]: 
1. Hazard review – a qualitative review of the installation to identify the hazards 
that are present. 
2. Hazard checklist – a review of the installation against a list of hazards that have 
been identified in previous hazard assessments. 
3. Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) – a systematic review of the process 
plant design. It is a method to identify hazards that might affect safety and 
operability based on the use of guidewords.  
4. Procedural HAZOP – a version of HAZOP applied to safety-critical operations 
such as drilling, rig-moves, heavy lifts etc. 
5. What-If Analysis – a flexible review technique which can be applied to any 
installation, operation or process, to identify hazards. 
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6. SWIFT – The Structured What-If Checklist technique combines the relatively 
unstructured What-If technique with the more organised and thorough aspects 
of the HAZOP technique. 
7. HAZID – a systematic review of the possible causes and consequences of 
hazardous events. 
8. Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) – a systematic review 
of a mechanical system, to evaluate the effects of failures of individual 
components. 
9. Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis – a systematic review of the ability 
of emergency systems to withstand accident conditions. 
10. Safety inspections and audits – visual examinations of an existing installation 
and its operating procedures to identify potential safety hazards. 
 
Figure 3: Hazard Identification Process [2] 
2.4.3. Frequency Analysis 
Frequency analysis estimates how likely it is for the accidents to occur. The 
frequencies are usually obtained from analysis of previous accident experience [3]. 
Sometimes the likelihood estimates are generated from a detailed analysis of past 
experience and available historical data and sometimes they are judgemental estimates 
based on specialist or expert’s view of the event.  
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In most risk assessment, the frequency or the likelihood is also expressed in term of 
the probability of the event. A frequency per year or per event in units of time may be 
used [5].  
The terms “probability” and “frequency” are often used in regards to risk.  
“Probability” is the ratio of the number of chances that a particular event may occur to 
the total number of chances. It is expressed as a number in the range 0 to 1, zero being 
the certainty that the event will not occur, and 1 the certainty that the event will occur. 
“Frequency” is a rate which expresses how often a particular event occurs within a 
stated time period. It is often expressed in terms such as 1 per 1 000 years. 
The difference between “frequency” and “probability” is clearly demonstrated by 
noting that an event has a frequency of occurrence of 4 per year whereas the probability 
of the event occurring in on year is less than 1 [6].  
The main approach for frequency analysis are [3]; 
 Historical accident data. 
 Fault Tree analysis which involves estimating the frequency of each 
component from a combination of historical data. 
 Theoretical modelling. 
 Event tree analysis is used to extend the initiating event frequency estimated 
into a failure case frequency combining with the consequence models. 
 Human reliability analysis. 
 Judgement evaluation. 
 Bayesian analysis.  
2.4.4. Consequence Analysis 
Consequence analysis evaluates the effects or harm caused by the accidents and their 
effects on employees involved, environment or assets of the business. Estimation of 
consequence is most often in the form of computer modelling but it can also be based 
on accident experience or expert’s judgements [3].  
When the frequencies and consequences of the event has been estimated, they can be 
combined to form overall risk.  
Calculating a total expected risk value R from [5]; 
10 
𝑅 = Σ𝑃𝑖 × 𝐶𝑖 
Whereas Pi is the likelihood or frequency of the event and Ci is the consequence of the 
event [5].  
Consequence analysis can involve [8]; 
 Consider existing controls or barriers to treat the consequences 
 Relating the consequences of the risk to the original objectives 
 Considering immediate consequences and those that may arise after a certain 
time has passed 
 Considering secondary consequences for instance those impacting upon 
associate activities or equipment. 
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Figure 4: Flow diagram of QRA [3] 
 
2.5. Tools for QRA 
2.5.1. Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is an evaluation technique that can be used to determine or 
estimate the various causes of a predicted hazardous event. FTA is used to identify 
causes of equipment failure and was used primarily used as a tool in reliability and 
availability assessment.  
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The fault tree is a graphical model displaying the various combinations of individual 
equipment failures of the system under study that can result in the happening of the 
hazardous event expected, usually referred to as the top event [6].  
A variety of information is provided by FTA to assist decision-making. Some of the 
roles of FTA in decision-making are [9]; 
1. To provide a visual, logic model of the basic causes and intermediate events 
leading to the top event. 
2. To prioritize the contributors to the top event. 
3. To use FTA to identify vulnerable areas in a system to prevent the top event. 
4. To monitor the performance of the system.  
5. To minimize and optimize resources. 
6. To assist in evaluating design alternatives and establish performance-based 
design requirements. 
7. To diagnose, identify and correct causes of the top event.  
A typical fault tree is composed of a number of symbols as shown in Figure 5 [9]. 
An example fault tree is shown below; 
 
Figure 5: Fault Tree Analysis example [3] 
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Simple fault trees can be analysed using a gate-by-gate approach to determine the top 












P (A) = Output event probability 
P (Bi) = Input event probabilities 
N = Number of input events 
∑ = Sum 
∏ = Product 
2.5.2. Event Tree Analysis 
An event tree analysis (ETA) is a graphical way of showing the possible outcomes of 
a hazardous event, such as a failure of equipment. ETA involves determining the 
responses of systems and operators to the hazardous event in order to determine all 
possible alternative outcomes.  
Event trees are used to identify the escalation paths of an event. Accident sequences 
provided by ETA is represented by logical AND combinations of events [6]. 
ETA can be used to brainstorm potential scenarios or sequences of events following 
an initiating event and how outcomes are affected by various treatments, barriers or 
control to mitigated undesired outcomes [8].  
The output of an ETA is the quantitative estimates of event frequencies or probabilities 
of various failure sequences and outcomes.  
There are two main ways in which event trees are used: 
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 Pre-incident applications – identifying the barriers or protective devices that 
could allow an incident precursor to develop into an actual failure. 
 Post-incident applications – exhibiting the various outcome that may result 
from a failure. 
An example of event tree used using failure probability of the protective device is 
shown below; 
 
Figure 7: Event Tree example [3] 
The quantification of an event tree can be used using spreadsheets or computer models. 
A probability is associated with each branch. In each case, the sum of the probabilities 
of each branch must be unity. The probabilities of each outcome are the products of 






P (A) = Outcome probability 
P (Bi) = Branch probabilities on route to outcome 
N = number of branches on route to outcome 




2.5.3. Risk Matrix 
The ISO 17776 Risk Matrix is a detailed matrix that has been designed for ranking and 
evaluation of risks in petroleum and natural gas industries. The ISO risk matrix is a 
5x5 matrix combining various categories of consequence and likelihood.  
The consequences are divided into four categories: people, assets, environment and 
reputation.  
 
Figure 8: ISO 17776 Risk Matrix [6] 
Numerical definitions for Risk Matrix [3]; 
1. Frequency 
 Frequent (Frequency>10) 
 Probable (1<Frequency<10) 
 Remote (0.1<Frequency<1) 
 Not likely (0.01<Frequency<0.1) 
 Improbable (Frequency<0.01) 
2. Consequence 
 Severe = Multiple fatalities 
 Very serious = A Fatality 
 Serious = Disabling 
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In order to achieve the objectives of this study, a study methodology is taken into 
consideration. The suitable methods are implemented in order to obtain the desired 
outcome. 
 
3.1. Project Activities 
There are SEVEN (7) project activities in performing this study which comprises of; 
1. Define the system of the case study. 
2. Draw simplified process flow diagram of the system under study. 
3. Identify the hazards related to the overall system and its sub-systems. 
4. Perform the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) based on the identified basic events. 
5. Perform the Event Tree Analysis (ETA) with the continuation from the top 
event of the developed FTA. 
6. Calculate the probabilities of occurrence. 
7. Complete the overall risk equation using Risk Matrix Approach and rank the 
risk(s) according to their risk level. 
  
18 
3.2. Project Flowchart 
 
Carry out literature review
Identify hazards
Apply Risk Matrix approach
Develop Fault Tree model
Develop Event Tree models
Integrate FTA and ETA models 
into bow-tie model
Estimate the probabilities of 
occurrence and the magnitude of 
the consequence
Is the bow-tie model 








Figure 9: Project flowchart 
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3.3. Project Milestone 
Below are the key milestones in order to assist the completion of the methodology of 
the study as well as to achieve the objectives of the project.   
Table 1: Key Milestones of the Study 
No. Activity FYP Week 
1 Selection of project topic 
1 
Week 1 
2 Submission of extended proposal Week 6 
3 Proposal defence Week 8 - 9 
4 
Completion of literature review and collection 
of data 
Week 12 
5 Submission of interim report draft Week 12 
6 Submission of interim report Week 14 
7 Analyzing data for hazard identification 
2 
Week 1 
8 Completion of fault tree model Week 3 
9 Completion of event tree models Week 6 
10 Submission of progress report Week 8 
11 Completion of bow-tie model Week 9 
12 Completion of risk assessment Week 11 
13 Submission of final report draft Week 12 
14 Submission of technical paper Week 13 
15 Oral presentation Week 14 




3.4. Project Gantt chart 
Please refer to Appendix 1 - Gantt chart for FYP 2013. 





Event Tree Analysis Fault Tree Analysis
Bow-Tie Model
Frequency Analysis Consequence Analysis







Figure 10: Bow-tie based QRA Flow Chart 
3.6. Constructing Fault Tree Analysis 
In order to construct a FTA, it is necessary to identify the basic events leading to the 
top event.  
Simple fault trees can be analysed using a gate-by-gate approach to determine the top 














P (A) = Output event probability 
P (Bi) = Input event probabilities 
N = Number of input events 
∑ = Sum 
∏ = Product 
3.7. Constructing Event Tree Analysis 
An event tree analysis requires an Initiating Event (IE) to begin with. In the case of a 
bow-tie based QRA, the Initiating Event is taken from the top event constructed in 
FTA together with its frequency.   
A probability is associated with each branch. In each case, the sum of the probabilities 
of each branch must be unity. The probabilities of each outcome are the products of 






P (A) = Outcome probability 
P (Bi) = Branch probabilities on route to outcome 
N = number of branches on route to outcome 
∏ = Product 
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3.8. Bow-tie based risk analysis 
Bow tie analysis is a diagrammatic way of describing and analysing the route of risk 
from causes to consequences.  
It can be considered to be a combination of a fault tree which analyses the cause of an 
event (represented by the knot of a bow tie) and an event tree analysing the 
consequences [8]. 
 
Figure 11: Representation of a bow tie analysis [8] 
Bow tie is used to display a risk showing a range of possible causes and consequences. 
It is very beneficial in showing the independent pathways leading to failure.  
The strengths of bow tie analysis: 
 It gives a clear pictorial representation of the problem. 
 It focuses attention on controls of both prevention and mitigation and their 
effectiveness. 
 It can be used for wanted consequences. 
 It does not require a high level of expertise to use.  
Bow tie diagram consists of five basic elements  
 Basic events 
 Fault Tree 
 Top Event  
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 Event Tree 
 Output events 
Fault Tree is placed on the left side of the diagram and it starts with the basic events 
and diverges until intermediate events leading to the top event.  
Event Tree is placed on the right side of the bow tie diagram which begins from the 
top event as the initiating event and follows by the sequence of events leading to 
possible multiple outcomes. 
Once the bow tie diagram is constructed, quantitative analyses can be executed using 
the conventional assumptions and mathematical operations of FTA and ETA [10] 
An example of a bow-tie diagram of oil and gas pipeline failure is as shown below; 
 
Figure 12: Bow tie diagram of natural gas pipeline failure [10] 
3.9. Risk Matrix Approach – Ranking the risks 
After the frequency of the outcomes based on the ETA constructed, risk matrix 
approach is utilized in order to complete the equation of the risk which is to multiply 
it with the impact or magnitude of the consequences or outcomes.  




Table 2: Risk matrix table 
 Frequent         
 Probable         
Likelihood Remote         
 Not likely         
 Improbable      
  Moderate Serious Very Serious Severe 









RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Overview 
This section will attempt to provide an overview of a case study of the implementation 
the proposed framework of the bow-tie based quantitative risk assessment (QRA) on 
a particular system of an offshore oil and gas platform.  
 
4.2. Case study – Implementation of the proposed bow-tie based QRA on the 
Erb West Field Platform  
Based on the proposed flowchart in the Chapter 3: Methodology, the case study will 
be executed on the equipment/unit level of the offshore oil and gas platform.  
Erb West Field is about 125 km offshore Kota Kinabalu, Sabah in 210 feet water depth 
and it is owned by PETRONAS Carigali Sdn. Bhd. (PCSB). The field was discovered 
in 1971 [11]. 
The Erb West facilities consist of Erb West Drilling Platform (EWDP-A), Erb West 
Drilling Platform B (EWDP-B), Erb West Production Platform A (EWP-A), Erb West 
Gas Platform A (EWG-A), Erb West Living Quarters A (EWQ-A), Erb West Venting 
A (EWV-A) and Erb West Venting Flare (EWV-AA) [11].  
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Figure 13: A picture of the Erb-West Complex, offshore Sabah (credits: 
http://blog.daum.net/yong1927/5553392) 
4.2.1. System Definition 
The proposed bow-tie based quantitative risk assessment is applied to various sub-
systems of an offshore processing unit (OPU) which is referred to in this paper as the 
overall system. The offshore processing unit (OPU) under study was taken from a 
simplified Process Flow Diagram (PFD) of the Erb West Production Platform A 
(EWP-A). These sub-systems include the separators (oil and condensate), 
compressors, a flash drum as well as a scrubber.  
The purpose of the production platform is to operate the wells and to separate the fluid 
from the wells into oil, gas condensate and water. 
At the terminal of the production platform, oil, gas and condensate and gas will be 
pumped and compressed to the onshore facility using pipelines or offloaded to the 
shuttle tanker.  
 The processing unit typically has 3 main parts which are the wellhead, separators and 
several gas compressions.  
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A typical layout of the offshore processing unit is depicted in Figure 14. Production 
lines from the wells end at the wellhead. The well fluid passes through a manifold and 
is withdrawn at a production separator. The main hazard possess by the well is possible 
blow. However, this case study will not include possible hazards from the wellhead 
but mainly focuses on the other major parts of the processing unit which are separation 
and gas compression.  
4.2.2. Process Description 
The Erb-West Production Platform simplified PFD is further minimized to simplify 
for the purpose of the QRA. The layout of the separators and compressors are arranged 
with the assistance from the paper which has done a risk assessment study of a similar 
layout of equipment [12]. The layout had been redrawn using Microsoft Visio and the 
proposed simplified system has only 2 separators (for oil and gas-condensate), 2 gas 
compressors, a flash drum and a scrubber.  























Figure 15: Simplified Process Flow Diagram of the Processing Unit taken from [12]
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The well fluid passes through separators where the fluid is separated into oil, gas-condensate, 
gas and water. In this layout, the oil passes through 2 separators and transported to the oil 
terminal as depicted on the simplified PFD of the production platform of Erb West Complex 
which in its case, to Labuan Crude Oil Terminal (LCOT).  
Gas is compressed using compressors and subsequently passed through the flash drum where 
the temperature is reduced, condensate formed and separated out. The gas is subsequently dried 
and purified and further compressed to high-high pressure through compressors. Part of the gas 
is used for gas reinjection and small amount are being flared.  
4.2.3. Hazard Identification 
The historical data of accidents and incidents recorded over the past period of time are gathered 
to generate the necessary input to conduct a quantitative risk assessment. The failure data has 
been reviewed and the equipment of the processing unit are grouped into 6 major hazard groups.  
According to the fire and explosion hazard index carried out on the similar processing unit, it 
is noted that Separator 1 has the highest index among the remaining hazard groups which 
indicated that it posed the highest level of risk.  
This has simplified the case study and subsequent procedures depicted by the proposed 
framework of the QRA can be continued which is followed by the Fault Tree Analysis.  
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Figure 16: Fire and Explosion Hazard Index for 6 equipment of processing unit as well as oil 
and gas pipeline [12] 
After identifying the most hazard group which is the Separator 1 of the offshore processing 
unit, the basic events pertaining to the possible failures of the Separator 1 are listed.  
In the case of Separator 1, the development of high-pressure in the separator causes the sub-
system to fail as BLEVE (Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion). This will become the 
top event for the Fault Tree Analysis.  
There are 21 basic events which will lead to the development of BLEVE to happen in Separator 
1. The basic events are tabulated with its individual failure frequency per year which had been 
retrieved from the database of Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD).  
Table 3: Basic events for a probable accident in Separator 1 
Failure 
Number 
Type of Failure Failure Frequency 
(per year) 
1 Flow control valve failed 0.0250 
2 Level indicator failed 0.0200 
3 Excess flow at upstream 0.0800 
4 Impurities causing exothermic reaction 0.0030 
5 Sudden change in pressure 0.0170 
6 Temperature controller failed 0.0200 
7 High-pressure upstream line 0.0700 
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8 Upstream pressure controller failed 0.0250 
9 Condensate line chocked 0.0021 
10 Oil pipeline choked 0.0075 
11 Gas pipeline or valve choked 0.0015 
12 Safety valve undersize 0.0500 
13 Pressure release valve choked or could not function on 
demand 
0.0015 
14 External heating 0.0150 
15 Exothermic reaction in vessel 0.0030 
16 Temperature controller failed 0.0020 
17 Pressure controller system of separator failed 0.0020 
18 Pressure of safety release inadequate 0.0015 
19 Ignition due to explosion energy 0.1500 
20 Ignition due to heat from surroundings 0.2000 




4.3. Fault Tree Analysis 
Based on the basic events identified and listed in the Hazard Identification section previously, the Fault Tree Analysis has been performed using a 
non-commercial licenced software entitled Logan Fault and Event Tree Analysis [13]. 
 




4.4. Event Tree Analysis 
After developing the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), the Top Event of the FTA was used as the Initiating Event (IE) and integrated in performing the Event 
Tree Analysis (ETA). The ETA was developed using the same non-commercial licenced software, Logan Fault and Event Tree Analysis software [13]. 
 





4.4.1. Bow Tie Diagram 
 
Figure 19: Bow Tie Diagram of Separator 1 hazards of Offshore Processing Unit
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4.5. Risk Matrix Approach 
It is desirable to rank the various possible hazard outcomes and screen the minor ones 
so as to concentrate the effort on the most hazardous one.  
Therefore, the possible outcomes of the bow tie diagram is ranked using the risk 
matrix; 
Numerical definitions for Risk Matrix [3]; 
1. Frequency 
 Frequent (Frequency>10) 
 Probable (1<Frequency<10) 
 Remote (0.1<Frequency<1) 
 Not likely (0.01<Frequency<0.1) 
 Improbable (Frequency<0.01) 




Risk event Likelihood Impact Rating 








Ac Uncontrolled fire with alarm Improbable Severe M 
Ad Uncontrolled with no alarm Improbable Severe M 
Ae No fire Improbable Serious L 
 
Based on Table 4, the possible outcomes are ranked and represented in the Risk Matrix 







 Frequent         
 Probable         
Likelihood Remote         
 Not likely         
 Improbable   (Ae)  (Aa), (Ab) (Ac), (Ad) 
  Moderate Serious Very Serious Severe 
   Impact   
 
Figure 20: Risk Matrix of the Possible Outcome of BLEVE 
4.6. Discussion 
The deliverables of this study is to produce a working framework of a bow-tie based 
Quantitative Risk Assessment of an offshore installation or operation. 
Using the case study of an Erb West Platform – Offshore Processing Unit, the 
framework has been proven to be able to identify the causes and the consequences of 
the most hazardous equipment of the system which is the Separator 1. 
From the bow-tie diagram as well, the escalation path leading to failures as well as the 
respective barriers to prevent the possible outcomes have been identified and this will 
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Understanding the risk assessment process is very essential in studying and managing 
risks. In this study, humble attempt has been made to provide an alternative approach 
in enhancing the field of risk management and methodology. 
Numerous risk assessment frameworks and risk analysis techniques have been 
explored. The literature review showed that there many different risk analysis and 
techniques to choose from.  
It is hoped that the content of this report will attempt to assist risk analysts, risk 
managers and engineers particularly in the oil and gas industries to make informed 
decisions. The content of this report serves as a theoretical platform for a generic 
framework of a bow-tie based quantitative risk assessment for readily application in 
the oil and gas industry.   
There are several reasons of why bow-tie based risk assessment methodology has a 
greater advantage in comparison to the various methodologies and tools. One of them 
is that bow-tie based QRA enjoy the benefits of having the frequency of the causes of 
hazards analysed using Fault Tree Analysis as well as the probability of the 
consequences identified and quantitatively determined using Event Tree Analysis. The 
magnitude or the severity of the consequences or outcomes is also assessed and 
classified using Risk Matrix Approach. The consequences derived from bow-tie QRA 
will be attributed into decision problems for risk management which decisions taken 
will be reflected back towards the causes. It is also useful for analysing accidents 




In order to overcome the problems and disadvantages of the various types of risk 
assessment and methodology, the author has produced the recommendations for the 
overall study based on the observation and the result generated. 
The recommendations are suggested for the benefits of this study such as ways to 
improve how the study is conducted to increase the reliability of the framework as well 
as steps that can be implemented by the oil and gas companies in improving the risk 
assessments and their methodology.  
5.1.1. Central concepts of Risk Management 
It is hoped that an enhanced central concepts in the field of risk management is to be 
developed for the benefit of all oil custodians around the world. This will benefit the 
industries in the way that knowledge and data sharing can be maximised as the 
individual companies will have the same concept of doing risk assessment.  
5.1.2. Historical accident and incident data sharing 
Not all companies can afford to handle the management of their accident and incident 
data sharing for the benefit of risk management applications. Certain companies are 
also limited in the historical database due to lack of funds and this will eventually limit 
their capability in executing their risk assessments. It is suggested that a common 
database with all essential terms and definitions are created in order for these historical 
accident and incident data can be efficiently managed and shared within the oil and 
gas industry.  
5.1.3. Employ advanced risk assessment frameworks and techniques 
Risk assessment and its methodology is generally a systematic scientific approach that 
is facilitated by frameworks. In this study, it has been shown that there is a wide range 
of risk assessment techniques have been developed and employed and some of the 
techniques are very advanced. Therefore, it is essential to employ only the most 
advanced risk assessment in addressing the risks within the oil and gas industry as a 
regulation as it would generate a higher degree of reliability and validity of the research 
results.  
5.1.4. Introducing generic standard of risk assessments 
Throughout the study, it is discovered that generic standard is limited with regard to 
offshore activities. By introducing a more widely accepted international standard on 
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risk assessment framework, it would facilitate and promote the use of risk assessment 
in parts of the world where there is not accustomed to applying such techniques. The 
introduction of a generic standard may facilitate communication and sharing of risk 
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Task Name Duration Start Finish
1 QRA of FPSO System using Bow-Tie Model 169 days? Mon 20/05/13 Fri 10/01/14
2 Select project topics 10 days Mon 20/05/13 Fri 31/05/13
3 Conduct preliminary research work 15 days Mon 03/06/13 Fri 28/06/13
4 Prepare extended proposal 10 days Mon 17/06/13 Fri 28/06/13
5 Submit extended proposal 0 days Wed 17/07/13 Wed 17/07/13
6 Prepare proposal defence 15 days Mon 01/07/13 Fri 19/07/13
7 Present proposal defence 0 days Thu 18/07/13 Thu 18/07/13
8 Prepare extensive literature review 25 days Mon 01/07/13 Fri 02/08/13
9 Gather guidelines for QRA 30 days Mon 01/07/13 Fri 09/08/13
10 Prepare draft for interim report 15 days Mon 05/08/13 Fri 23/08/13
11 Submit interim report 0 days Mon 26/08/13 Mon 26/08/13
12 Perform hazard identification 20 days Mon 02/09/13 Fri 27/09/13
13 Develop fault tree analysis 20 days Mon 30/09/13 Fri 25/10/13
14 Complete fault tree analysis 0 days Fri 25/10/13 Fri 25/10/13
15 Develop event tree models 15 days Mon 28/10/13 Fri 15/11/13
16 Complete event tree analysis 0 days Fri 15/11/13 Fri 15/11/13
17 Prepare progress report 15 days Mon 18/11/13 Fri 06/12/13
18 Develop a bow-tie model 10 days? Mon 18/11/13 Fri 29/11/13
19 Prepare Risk Matrix 5 days Mon 02/12/13 Fri 06/12/13
20 Prepare final report draft 10 days Mon 16/12/13 Fri 27/12/13
21 Prepare technical report 10 days Mon 16/12/13 Fri 27/12/13
22 Oral presentation 0 days Mon 06/01/14 Mon 06/01/14
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